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.1 
  ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reassesses the debate over the role of education in farm production in Bangladesh 
using a large dataset on rice producing households from 141 villages. Average and 
stochastic production frontier functions are estimated to ascertain the effect of education on 
productivity and efficiency. A full set of proxies for farm education stock variables are 
incorporated to investigate the ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ returns to education. The 
external effect is investigated in the context of rural neighborhoods. Our analysis reveals that 
in addition to raising rice productivity and boosting potential output, household education 
significantly reduces production inefficiencies. However, we are unable to find any evidence 
of externality benefit of schooling. We discuss the implication of these findings for rural 
education programs in Bangladesh. 
Key words: Agriculture, returns to education, stochastic production frontier, Bangladesh. 
JEL classifications: I21, Q12, N5. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Despite common beliefs regarding the benefits of schooling in farm activities, there is 
inconclusive evidence to advocate educational investment in agrarian societies. For instance, 
Ali and Flinn (1989), Wang et al. (1996), and Seyoum et al. (1998) demonstrate significant 
role of farmers’ education in raising farming efficiency in Pakistan Punjab, India, and China, 
respectively. On the other hand, Battese and Coelli (1995) and Llewellyn and Williams 
(1996) fail to identify any significant impact of farmers’ education on farming efficiency in 
India, and Java-Indonesia, respectively. Nevertheless, there is some agreement in the 
literature that education significantly influences adoption of technological innovations in 
agriculture (e.g., Weir and Knight 2004, Asfaw and Admassie 2004).  
One reason for the differences in findings across studies lies in the cross-country 
variation in the nature of technology underlying agricultural production. An education effect 
is more likely to prevail in economies where farm production is modernizing (e.g. Asia) as 
opposed to being traditional (e.g. Latin America and Africa) (Philips 1994). Bangladesh 
agriculture has also undergone significant modernization so that a positive return is also more 
likely for the Bangladeshi data.  Surprisingly, a majority of studies on returns to education in 
farm production in Bangladesh fails to find any significant impact (see for instance, Deb 
(1995), Wadud and White 2000; and Coelli et al. 2002). The only study that reports a positive 2 
 education effect on farm efficiency is Sharif and Dar (1996). However, findings of this study 
are difficult to generalize for it uses a highly purposive sample. 
A potential explanation for the failure of earlier research on farm production function 
using Bangladeshi data to detect an ‘education effect’ lies in the methodology. First, the older 
studies preclude the possibility of centralized decision making in farm work (Yang 1998). 
Consequently, farm education stock is modeled either as education of the household-head or 
that of an average householder. Such proxies may contain little information and therefore, 
undermine the actual returns to education. Second, the existing studies on farm production in 
Bangladesh exclusively centre on internal returns to schooling, ruling out presence of any 
externality effect of education in improving productivity and efficiency.  
A key aspect of social organization in rural Bangladesh is the clustering of households 
in a unique residential neighborhood commonly known as ‘bari’. Households belonging to 
the same neighborhood maintain significant social ties which may have implications for farm 
production activities. Farmers might learn by observing (superior) input choices of their 
educated neighbors who are engaged in farm work. Alternatively, educated neighbors could 
simply share their literacy knowledge with uneducated farmers. Externality arising from bari-
level education could serve as an important non-market determinant of farm-level 
productivity and efficiency.  
The present study is thus set to examine two important issues in Bangladesh. First, we 
test for the internal effect of education. That is, whether household’s own education raises 
farm productivity and efficiency. Second, we test for the presence of any external effect of 
education. It is examined whether in addition to household education; farm production is 
positively influenced by education of others in the residential neighborhood. We do so by 
estimating the average production function as well as stochastic production frontier for rice 
cultivation in Bangladesh with controls for a host of farm inputs, education stock measures 
and villages-level determinants.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the study 
area, the methodology, empirical specifications of the production functions and the data.   
Section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 is conclusion. 
 
2.  Methodology 
2.1  The study area 
The farm households in this study belong to the Matlab Thana of Chandpur district in 
Bangladesh. The Matlab Thana comprises of a total of 141 villages. The villagers primarily 3 
 rely on the local economy for their livelihoods. Agriculture constitutes the key source of 
earnings. Rice is the principal crop item in Matlab villages, in terms of its share in total cereal 
production. About 50 per cent of the households are landless. Increasing population growth 
and density has also led to fragmentation of landholdings. Therefore, most of the farmers in 
the study area operate as smallholders or sharecroppers. 
2.2  Modeling internal and external benefits of education on productivity and efficiency 
Application of an average production function as well as the stochastic production frontier 
framework is appropriate to analyze internal and external benefit of education on productivity 
and efficiency. Two basic hypotheses are tested (distinguishing between internal and external 
effects): whether education affects (a) productivity as well as placement of the frontier (that 
is, influence production as well as increase potential output), and (b) deviations from the 
frontier (that is, affect production efficiency). The internal benefit of education on 
productivity and placement of the frontier is captured by specifying education at the 
household level as an independent variable in the average production function and in the 
stochastic production frontier function, respectively. The external benefit of education on 
productivity and placement of the frontier is captured by specifying neighborhood level 
education as an independent variable in these models.  
The production structure of rice farmers in Bangladesh is specified using a single-
output multi-input Cobb-Douglas production function and a stochastic production frontier, 
respectively. The general form of production function and the stochastic production frontier 
for the ith farm is expressed, respectively as: 
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 the truncated random variable; ln is the natural logarithm; and ak, b0, bj, jm, d0, and dd are 
the parameters to be estimated.   
  The production efficiency of the farm i is defined as: 
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Where E is the expectation operator. This is achieved by obtaining the expressions for the 
conditional expectation ui upon the observed value of (vi-ui). The method of maximum 
likelihood is used to estimate the unknown parameters, with the stochastic production frontier 
and the inefficiency effects functions estimated simultaneously. The likelihood function is 
expressed in terms of the variance parameters, 
2 2 2
u v s s s + =  and 
2 2 /s s g u = (Battese and 
Coelli 1995). 
The internal benefit of education is measured by two variables: (a) education level of 
the household-head (completed years of schooling), and (b) maximum education (completed 
years of schooling) among adult householders (aged 19 years and over). The external benefit 
of education is measured by the maximum years of schooling among adult neighbors
1. Eight 
specifications were adopted using three types of education variables to examine internal and 
external effects of education on farm productivity and efficiency. The productivity effects 
were analyzed by placing these variables in the production function as well as the stochastic 
production frontier while the efficiency effects were analyzed by placing them in the 
inefficiency effects model. 
Identification of neighborhood externality as a causal effect is dubious if there are 
other determinants of farm productivity and efficiency that operate at the village level. If the 
omitted village determinants positively affect farm productivity and are positively correlated 
with our neighborhood education measures, the estimate of education externality is likely to 
be upwards. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that a bias may prevail due to the 
omission of neighborhood level unobserved correlates of farm productivity so that our 
estimates of externalities are likely to be upward biased. 
2.3  Data 
Data for this study comes from the Matlab Health and Socio-economic Survey (MHSS). The 
survey was conducted in all villages of the Matlab Thana in the year 1996 (Rahman et al. 
2001). The sample households were selected in two steps. First, a random sample of 2678 
residential neighborhoods – baris – was selected from the entire Matlab Thana. In the second 
                                                   
1 The neighbourhood variable is constructed by excluding all members of the index household.  5 
 step, households were sampled. If a bari had just one household, it was always selected. In 
case of multi-household baris, two households were selected at random from each of the 
sample baris. This led to a total sample of 4368 households.  
While all the households completed the module on farm production, only 56.5 per 
cent (2469 households) of them were engaged in agricultural production. After purging this 
sample of potential outliers, the final sample contains a total of 2357 rice producing 
households. Of these, the majority (85%) comes from multiple-household neighborhoods 
where the mean number of households is six. For these households, the externality variable is 
a measure of education in the other (sampled) household in the neighborhood. The remaining 
352 households (15% of the sample), however, belong to single-household baris so that 
neighborhood education is set to zero for these households.  
 
3.  Results 
The summary statistics of the variables used appear in Table 1. OLS regression is used to 
estimate the parameters of the average production function models and Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) procedure is used to estimate the parameters of the stochastic production 
frontier and inefficiency effects models jointly in a single stage. All model specifications 
include four basic farm variables – land, purchased inputs, home supplied inputs, and farm 
capital assets used directly for rice production. Also, all model specifications control for 
village fixed-effects (to purge the data of the village-level unobserved determinants of farm 
output) unless mentioned otherwise. A test for the significance of fixed-effects in all 
specifications rejected the null hypothesis of ‘no influence’ at 1 per cent level of significance.  
3.1  Productivity effects of education 
Table 2 presents OLS estimates (with fixed effects) of extended Cobb-Douglas (C-D)
2 
production functions incorporating alternative specifications of the education variables to 
account for internal and external benefits of education on rice production. Overall, these six 
specifications are able to explain 63-65 per cent of variation in rice production which is much 
higher than the explanatory power of the OLS models of average production function 
(with/without fixed-effects) reported in other studies.  
                                                   
2 The rationale to use C-D specification as opposed to a flexible Translog specification is that we are specifying 
our models with 139 village dummies to control for village level correlates of productivity and efficiency, 
leaving our variable list to vary from 144 to 149 variables in production frontier models alone. Other studies 
with similar specification also used C-D model, for example Weir and Knight (Forthcoming). 
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  All basic farm variables significantly influence rice production and the estimates are 
robust irrespective of model specifications. The effect of land is dominant as expected. 
Output elasticity of land varies from 0.65 to 0.71 implying that a 1 per cent increase in land 
area will increase rice production by 0.65 to 0.71 per cent. Since, Cobb-Douglas model is 
used, sum of coefficients of all basic farm variables provides a direct estimate of the ‘returns 
to scale’ in rice production. The sum varies from 0.83 to 0.87 indicating decreasing returns to 
scale. Appleton and Balihuta (1996) and Weir and Knight (2004) also reported decreasing 
returns to scale in cereal production for Ugandan and Ethiopian farmers respectively. Given 
widespread reporting of scale inefficiency among farmers in developing countries, estimates 
of ‘decreasing returns to scale’ seems consistent with expectation.  
The internal (household-level) benefits of education in rice production are first 
explored in neighborhood fixed-effects models (1) and (2) in Table 2. The motivation 
underlying joint control for head’s schooling and that of other householders (Model 2) is that 
production decisions are likely to be collectively made when farm size is small. The 
distinction between farm managers and workers is marginal in such a setting. While 
contributions of all may matter, the highest educated in the household is likely to play the 
lead role. We find that the effect of household education is 6.4%, comparable to the labor 
market returns to education (7%) in the study villages (Berman and Stepanyan 2003).   
Household-head’s education has no effect, however.  
To explore the external (neighborhood-level) benefits, we re-estimate the production 
functions with village fixed effects and an additional control for neighbor’s education 
(Models 3-6, Table 2). Model (3) proxies for farm education using head’s schooling only. 
Model (4) additionally controls for maximum education among other householders. Model 
(5) jointly controls for head’s schooling and maximum education in the neighborhood. Lastly, 
Model (6) includes all three measures of education.  
We find that an additional year of household-head’s education increases rice 
production by 4 per cent (Model 3). But controlling for maximum adult education in the 
household, head’s education has no impact (Models 4 and 6). This finding confirms our 
earlier conjecture that farm production within the household is a centralized activity so that 
the most educated household member plays the key role in decision making. The external 
benefit of education, measured by neighbor’s education level is weak (Models 3 and 4). 
When specified jointly with household head’s education, one year of additional schooling at 
the neighborhood level increases rice production by 3 per cent (p<0.10) and is similar to the 
estimate of Weir and Knight (2004) for Ethiopian cereal farmers. However, additionally 7 
 controlling for maximum schooling among other householders, the neighborhood effect 
disappears. We also re-estimated the regressions with alternative measures of neighbor’s 
education (e.g. mean education of adults or education of the head in the neighboring 
household). However, our results remained unchanged. 
  In the next stage we relax the assumption of fully efficient rice farmers and estimate 
stochastic production frontier models to allow for farm-specific inefficiencies. The predicted 
farm specific inefficiencies are then modeled as a function of selected farm and village level 
characteristics. In all specifications, both the stochastic production frontier and inefficiency 
effects models are estimated simultaneously. These results are summarized in Table 3. 
  The influence of basic farm variables on potential rice output is robust and mirrors 
those obtained from the average production function models. The first four models in Table 3 
provide alternative specifications to account for internal and external benefits of education on 
the placement of the rice production frontier. A positive significant coefficient on the relevant 
variable will establish the evidence of its influence on upward shift of the rice production 
frontier. Once again, we find strong evidence of internal benefits of education in shifting the 
rice production frontier outward. The level and magnitude of influence mirrors those obtained 
in the average production function estimation results reported in Table 2. An additional year 
of schooling of household head or adult members within the household will shift the rice 
production frontier by 3–6 per cent. However, when head’s education and that of other adult 
householders are controlled simultaneously, coefficient on the former becomes insignificant. 
This is consistent with the argument of centralized planning. To sum, the most educated 
member raises farm output not only through boosting average output, but also by shifting the 
production frontier.  
  Turning to the external benefit of education on shifting the rice production frontier, 
however, evidence is still weak. When included alongside the head’s education, an additional 
year of schooling in the neighborhood seems to shift the rice production frontier by 3 per cent 
(p<0.10). But with additional control for maximum education of adult householder, 
neighborhood education has no impact. 
3.2  Efficiency effects of education 
Given robust internal benefits of education in rice productivity and placement of the 
production frontier and missing external benefits of education in the same, we next 
investigate the influence of education on technical efficiency. Prior to the discussion of these 
effects, we briefly highlight the farm-specific efficiency scores presented in Table 4. The 
mean efficiency level varies between 71 to 73 per cent across specifications indicating that 8 
 rice production can be increased up to 27 to 29 per cent by improving technical efficiency 
alone with no additional use of resources. The minimum efficiency level is 12 per cent while 
the maximum is 94 per cent. The results are similar to those reported by Wadud and White 
(2000) and Coelli et al. (2002) for Bangladesh.  
Models 5 through 8 in Table 3 present the results of 4 alternative specifications of 
internal and external effects of education on technical efficiency. Five variables representing 
farm characteristics and selected village-level characteristics are used to explain farm-specific 
technical inefficiency in addition to variables representing internal and external effects of 
education (for details, see lower panel of Table 1). Non-agricultural income share seems to be 
the dominant variable in explaining technical efficiency. The significant positive sign on this 
coefficient points towards a situation where households with higher opportunity to engage in 
non-agricultural activities fail to pay high attention to their rice production activities and 
therefore, are highly inefficient. The result is similar and consistent with findings of Ali and 
Flinn (1989), Wang et al. (1996) and Rahman (2003). Rice producers also benefit 
significantly from better infrastructure
3. Underdeveloped infrastructure has negative effects 
on technical efficiency, as farmers may not have the required inputs to use at the correct time, 
or not at all. This result corroborates the findings of Ali and Flinn (1989), Coelli et al. (2002) 
and Rahman (2003), indicating that farmers in remote villages are less efficient after 
accounting for other correlates of efficiency. Weak evidence that owner operators are 
relatively efficient than the tenants is also found. 
  Turning to our variables of interest, we find weak evidence of external benefits of 
education on improving technical efficiency (Models 7 and 8). The coefficient on the 
neighbor’s education variable is significant in Model 7 only. Once we additionally control for 
adult education within the household, neighborhood education becomes insignificant (Model 
8).  
 
4.  Conclusions and policy implications 
This study reassessed the puzzle over low returns to schooling in farm work in Bangladesh 
using a large dataset on rural rice producing households spread over 141 villages. Three sets 
of results follow from our empirical analysis. First, the results espouse existence of internal 
benefits of education in rice production: education matters in raising productivity, boosting 
                                                   
3  The infrastructure index is defined as the level of underdevelopment of infrastructure. Hence, a positive 
coefficient on this variable indicates positive effect on efficiency. 
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 potential output and improving efficiency. This is consistent with the fact that farm work in 
Bangladesh involves modern varieties of seeds and inputs. There are several implications of 
such a positive education effect. First, similar to labor market returns to education, schooling 
is relevant even in an agrarian setting where wage work opportunities may be limited. This, 
therefore, questions the commonly held view that household investment in children’s 
schooling in agrarian societies is discouraged by a lack of return to education in farm work.  
Second, the finding that proximity to an educated adult in the household boosts farm 
productivity implies that not all farmers who are uneducated are equally worse-off in farm 
work. Earlier studies (for example, Sharif and Dar, 1996) on the effect of education on rice 
production inefficiency in Bangladesh probably overstate the efficiency loss suffered by less 
educated farmers in rural Bangladesh. Given the evidence of a centralized production regime, 
public policy should therefore aim at targeting farm households where all members are 
uneducated. If the education effect merely reflects the impact of basic literacy and numeracy 
skills, then a well-designed adult literacy programs could serve as a potential intervention.  
Our data supports the relative importance of basic education over higher education in 
agriculture. Household head’s education, when decomposed by levels of education shows 
that having primary and secondary education over and above zero year of education has a 
significant impact on productivity (results suppressed). Farmers who complete secondary 
schooling also enjoy significant efficiency gains (results suppressed) suggesting that basic 
literacy skill, usually attained during primary and secondary schooling is more relevant in 
farm production than tertiary education.  
   The third important finding relates to education externalities. The absence of a 
‘neighborhood education effect’ in farm production is at contrast with other studies that have 
tested for similar effects using developing country data (for example, Weir and Knight 
Forthcoming). The precise reason for this discrepancy is not clear. One possibility is that 
educational spill-over effects on potential output arise through adoption of HYV 
varieties/technologies. But adoption rate is higher in Bangladesh (including the study 
villages) compared to Ethiopian villages so that returns to education in the form of ‘learning-
from-others’ is likely to be less in Bangladesh.  
In conclusion, evidence of significant household education effect is consistent with 
the fact that farmers in Bangladesh operate in a modernizing environment (for example, one 
where there are changes in technology and infrastructure) compared to other regions such as 
Africa and Latin America where farm production is largely traditional. Despite such returns, 
distribution of education stock is sparse in rural Bangladesh. A vast majority of the farming 10 
 population remains uneducated or live in isolation of other educated individuals (in own 
household or in the residential neighborhood). Consequently, only a fraction of them succeed 
in appropriating returns from advanced technology in farm work. Lack of education (or 
access to it) then partly explains why Bangladesh agriculture has not been able to fully 
exploit the available technologies. In spite of modernization, total factor productivity growth 
in agriculture has declined at an annual rate of 0.23 per cent per year for the period 1961–
1992 mainly owing to dramatically falling efficiency despite strong technological progress 
(Coelli et al. 2003). Current policy initiatives of the government to expand educational 
opportunities in rural areas of the country are therefore well-placed and promise significant 
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Variables  Description  Full Sample 
    Mean Std. Dev. 
Farm variables     
Rice output
a  Unit of measurement: kg  1615.79 1888.73 
Area cultivated  Unit of measurement: hectare  0.51 0.65 
Purchased inputs
b  Unit of measurement: Taka
d  4133.43 4315.82 
Home supplied inputs
c  Unit of measurement: Taka
d  306.40 861.29 
Value of farm capital assets  Unit of measurement: Taka
d  1001.51 5963.08 
Education variables     
Household head’s education  Years of schooling completed  3.07 3.66 
Primary education (grade 1 – 5)  Dummy (1 if head’s education is grade 1–5, 0 otherwise)  0.31 0.36 
Secondary education (grade 6 – 10)  Dummy (1 if head’s education is grade 6–10, 0 otherwise)  0.18 0.38 
Higher secondary and above (grade 11+)  Dummy (1 if head’s education is grade >10, 0 otherwise)  0.04 0.21 
Adult education in household   Maximum years of schooling completed (among adults)  5.78 4.11 
Neighbor’s education  Maximum years of schooling completed (among adults)  6.73 3.97 
Other variables     
Age of the farmer  Years  49.17 13.13 
Household head is female  Dummy (1 if head is female, 0 otherwise)  0.08 0.28 
Tenurial status  Dummy (1 if owner operator, 0 otherwise)  0.48 0.50 
Irrigation facilities in village  Dummy (1 if have irrigation, 0 otherwise)  0.97 0.16 
Infrastructure index
f  Aggregate index of village-level facilities  4.20 4.70 
Non-agricultural income share  Unit of measurement: Proportion  0.50 0.43 
N    2357  
Note: 
a  = We have aggregated the volume of rice produced over all three seasons covering a crop year because data do not distinguish between the varieties of rice 
produced in each season. In this specification, we implicitly assume that the production function of both traditional and modern rice is same. Also, our main focus is 
to determine the internal and external benefits of education on overall rice production (the main staple and dominant crop in Bangladeshi farming) which is unlikely 
to differ across seasons for the same household.  
 
b = Purchased inputs include seeds/seedlings, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, hired labor, and hired animal power services. 
 
c = Home supplied inputs include all family labor, animal power services, manures, and seeds. 
d = Exchange rate, 1 USD = Taka 48.06 in 1998/99 (BBS, 2001) 
f = The index of underdevelopment of infrastructure is constructed using a cost-of-access approach. A total of six infrastructural indicators are used. These are: local 
market, bank, thana, headquarter, bus stop, boat station and telephone office.    1 
 Table 2: Estimates of average production function (Dependent variable: Natural log of rice produced) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  2.832  2.815  2.91  2.879  2.885  2.876 
  (21.89)**  (21.77)**  (40.42)**  (39.65)**  (39.28)**  (39.16)** 
Farm variables                 
ln Land  0.712  0.703  0.661  0.655  0.658  0.654 
  (26.01)**  (25.44)**  (45.96)**  (45.12)**  (45.55)**  (45.07)** 
ln Purchased inputs  0.122  0.118  0.134  0.134  0.135  0.134 
  (6.06)**  (5.87)**  (12.13)**  (12.06)**  (12.14)**  (12.06)** 
ln Home supplied inputs  0.023  0.021  0.021  0.02  0.021  0.02 
  (3.25)**  (2.96)**  (4.98)**  (4.81)**  (4.95)**  (4.81)** 
ln Farm assets  0.012  0.012  0.019  0.018  0.018  0.018 
  (1.73)+  (1.69)+  (4.40)**  (4.25)**  (4.28)**  (4.23)** 
Education variables             
ln Head’s education  -0.011  -0.031  0.037  0.014  0.026  0.013 
  (0.47)  (1.24)  (2.90)**  (0.92)  (1.87)+  (0.86) 
ln Adult education in HH  -  0.064  -  0.054  -  0.052 
  -  (2.00)*  -  (3.05)**  -  (2.51)* 
ln Neighbor’s education   -  -  -  -  0.027  0.005 
  -  -  -  -  (1.75)+  (0.26) 
Adjusted R
2  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65  0.65 
F test  321.89  270.22  1081.95  906.55  902.98  776.73 
Village fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Neighborhood fixed effects  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
N  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357 
Notes: (1) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (2) + significant at 10 per cent; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent.   2 
Table 3: Estimates of stochastic production frontier (Dependent variable: Natural log of rice produced) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Production frontier model                 
Constant  3.691  3.636  3.659  3.636  3.710  3.749  3.735  3.752 
  (11.00)**  (10.84)**  (10.91)**  (10.83)**  (10.92)**  (11.23)**  (10.99)**  (11.20)** 
Farm variables                 
ln Land  0.665  0.657  0.662  0.657  0.665  0.657  0.660  0.657 
  (47.63)**  (46.75)**  (47.31)**  (46.73)**  (46.67)**  (45.27)**  (45.97)**  (45.28)** 
ln Purchased inputs  0.114  0.112  0.114  0.112  0.113  0.112  0.113  0.112 
  (11.52)**  (11.48)**  (11.56)**  (11.47)**  (11.36)**  (11.20)**  (11.34)**  (11.22)** 
ln Home supplied inputs  0.020  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.019  0.019 
  (5.11)**  (4.90)**  (5.08)**  (4.90)**  (5.07)**  (4.88)**  (5.02)**  (4.89)** 
ln Farm assets  0.016  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.016  0.015  0.015  0.015 
  (4.07)**  (3.89)**  (3.93)**  (3.88)**  (4.13)**  (3.95)**  (3.99)**  (3.92)** 
Education variables                 
ln Head’s education  0.039  0.011  0.027  0.011         
  (3.20)**  (0.77)  (2.05)*  (0.75)         
ln Adult education in HH    0.063    0.063         
    (3.80)**    (3.27)**         
ln Neighbor’s education       0.028  0.001         
      (1.94)+  (0.04)         
Model diagnostics                 
Log Likelihood  -1695.00  -1687.83  -1693.13  -1687.83  -1696.36  -1690.08  -1692.07  -1689.52 
Wald 㱰
2   6460.96  6529.81  6476.50  6529.27  6123.43  5699.03  5954.83  5703.94 
Prob > 㱰
2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
㬰  0.822  0.821  0.825  0.821  0.792  0.747  0.774  0.748 
  (13.20)**  (13.60)**  (13.24)**  (13.55)**  (12.18)**  (10.67)**  (11.42)**  (10.64)** 
㰰
2  0.830  0.807  0.839  0.808  0.709  0.576  0.652  0.579 
  (2.94)**  (3.07)**  (2.89)**  (3.06)**  (3.41)**  (4.01)**  (3.62)**  (3.96)** 
Inefficiency effects  model                 
Constant  -2.942  -3.018  -3.055  -3.020  -2.212  -1.470  -1.867  -1.478 
  (1.78)+  (1.86)+  (1.78)+  (1.86)+  (1.78)+  (1.71)+  (1.75)+  (1.70)+ 
Age  0.002  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.006  0.005  0.006   3 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  (0.48)  (1.02)  (0.72)  (1.02)  (0.63)  (1.71)+  (1.29)  (1.73)+ 
Head is female  0.347  0.402  0.379  0.402  0.280  0.283  0.310  0.293 
  (1.42)  (1.68)+  (1.51)  (1.68)+  (1.43)  (1.84)+  (1.70)+  (1.87)+ 
Tenurial status  0.146  0.157  0.160  0.157  0.145  0.140  0.152  0.143 
  (1.04)  (1.15)  (1.10)  (1.15)  (1.23)  (1.54)  (1.41)  (1.56) 
Irrigation  0.770  0.809  0.774  0.809  0.662  0.467  0.579  0.479 
  (0.77)  (0.82)  (0.76)  (0.82)  (0.80)  (0.79)  (0.81)  (0.80) 
Village infrastructure  0.049  0.046  0.049  0.046  0.043  0.038  0.040  0.037 
  (2.06)*  (2.04)*  (2.03)*  (2.04)*  (2.12)*  (2.33)*  (2.17)*  (2.31)* 
Non-agril. income share  1.011  0.987  1.014  0.987  0.891  0.730  0.847  0.740 
  (3.12)**  (3.24)**  (3.09)**  (3.23)**  (3.48)**  (3.82)**  (3.53)**  (3.74)** 
Head’s education          -0.050  -0.004  -0.021  -0.002 
          (2.15)*  (0.21)  (1.04)  (0.09) 
Adult HH education            -0.057    -0.046 
            (2.74)**    (2.08)* 
Neighbor’s education              -0.045  -0.017 
              (2.23)*  (0.99) 
N  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357  2357 
Note: (1) Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses (2) + significant at 10 per cent; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent (3) All specifications include 139 
villages dummies in the production frontier model. 
Table 4: Technical efficiency scores of rice farmers 
Model specifications  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Model 1  0.728  0.133  0.123  0.944 
Model 2  0.727  0.134  0.123  0.943 
Model 3  0.729  0.133  0.123  0.944 
Model 4  0.727  0.134  0.123  0.943 
Model 5  0.722  0.134  0.133  0.942 
Model 6  0.713  0.136  0.134  0.942 
Model 7  0.720  0.135  0.132  0.941 
Model 8  0.713  0.136  0.133  0.942 
Note: Technical efficiency scores correspond to Table 3. 